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Abstract
To resolve conflicts among norms, various nonmonotonic formalisms can be used to perform
prioritized normative reasoning. Meanwhile, formal argumentation provides a way to represent
nonmonotonic logics. In this paper, we propose a representation of prioritized normative rea-
soning by argumentation. Using hierarchical abstract normative systems, we define three kinds
of prioritized normative reasoning approaches, called Greedy, Reduction, and Optimization.
Then, after formulating an argumentation theory for a hierarchical abstract normative system,
we show that for a totally ordered hierarchical abstract normative system, Greedy and Reduction
can be represented in argumentation by applying the weakest link and the last link principles
respectively, and Optimization can be represented by introducing additional defeats capturing
the idea that for each argument that contains a norm not belonging to the maximal obeyable set
then this argument should be rejected.
Keywords: Deontic logic, formal argumentation, norms, normative systems, normative
multiagent systems
1 Introduction
Since the work of Alchourro´n and Makinson [1] on hierarchies of regulations and their
logic, in which a partial ordering on a code of laws or regulations is used to overcome
logical imperfections in the code itself, reasoning with prioritized norms has been a
central challenge in deontic logic [12,4,24].
The goal of this paper is to study the open issue of reasoning with priorities over
norms through the lens of argumentation theory [10]. More precisely, we focus on
reasoning with the abstract normative system proposed by Tosatto et al. [28], which
in turn is based on Makinson and van der Torre’s approach to input/output logic [20].
In this system, an abstract norm is represented by an ordered pair (a, x), where the
body of the norm a is thought of as an input, representing some kind of condition or
situation, and the head of the norm x is thought of as an output, representing what
the norm tells us to be obligatory in that situation a. As a consequence, an abstract
normative system is a directed graph (L,N) together with a context C ⊆ L capturing
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base facts, whereL is a set of nodes, andN ⊆ L×L is the set of abstract norms. When
the edge of an abstract normative system is associated with a number to indicate its
priority over the other norms in the system, we obtain a hierarchical abstract normative
system (HANS), which will be formally defined and studied in the remainder of this
paper.
Let us clarify how a hierarchical abstract normative system is defined by consider-
ing the well known Order Puzzle [17] example from the deontic logic literature, which
revolves around three norms.
“Suppose that there is an agent, called Corporal O’Reilly, and that he is subject
to the commands of three superior officers: a Captain, a Major, and a Colonel.
The Captain, who does not like to be cold, issues a standing order that, during the
winter, the heat should be turned on. The Major, who is concerned about energy
conservation, issues an order that, during the winter, the window should not be
opened. And the Colonel, who does not like to be too warm and does not care about
energy conservation, issues an order that, whenever the heat is on, the window
should be opened.”
h
ow
1
2
3
1: (w,h)
2: (w,¬o)
3: (h,o)
Hierarchical Abstract
Normative System
T
Extensions 
Greedy: {h,¬o}
Reduction: {h,o}
Optimization: {¬o}
Fig. 1. The Order puzzle example, represented using the graphical notation of Tosatto et al. [29]
with edges annotated by norm strength.
Let w, h and o respectively denote the propositions that it is winter, the heat is
turned on, and the window is open. There are three norms (w, h), (w,¬o) and (h, o).
These three norms are visualized in Figure 1, extending the graphical notation
described in Tosatto et al. [29] by associating edges with numbers denoting priorities
of norms. These priorities are obtained from the rank of the issuer, since Colonels
outrank Majors, and Majors outrank Captains. Within the figure, each circle denotes
a proposition; the light part of the circle is the proposition itself, while the dark part
denotes a negated proposition. Dashed lines represent the conditional obligations.
Within Figure 1, the line from the light part of w to the dark part of o denotes (w,¬o).
The box on the left represents the context, in the example containing > and w.
In formalizing examples, one problem in applied logic is that the representation
may be challenged. For example, it may be argued that the Colonel implies that if the
window is closed, then the heating should be turned off. However, in normative sys-
tems, such pragmatic considerations are usually not part of the detachment procedure
[16], with only explicitly given norms and commands being considered. Therefore,
any such additional interpretations or other pragmatic concerns are out of the scope of
this paper.
The central notion of inference in normative systems is called detachment. For
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example, in the Order Puzzle, the fundamental question is whether we can detach o,
¬o, or both. In the example, the formulas which can be derived from a normative
system are obligations. In general, permissions and institutional facts can also be
detached from normative systems. A detachment procedure therefore defines the way
deontic facts are derived from a normative system. Different detachment procedures
have been defined and studied in deontic logic, as well as in other rule based systems.
Moreover, even in hierarchical normative systems, not all conflicts may be resolved.
In such a case, the detachment procedure may derive several so-called extensions, each
representing a set of obligations, permissions and institutional facts.
Abstract normative systems [28] were introduced as a common core representa-
tion for normative systems, which are still expressive enough to define the main de-
tachment procedures. In particular, analogous to the main input/output logics, they
have factual detachment built in, and have reasoning by cases, deontic detachment
and identity as optional inference patterns [3,16]. Such systems are called ‘abstract’,
because negation is the only logical connective that is defined in the language. Fur-
thermore, Tosatto et al. [28] considered elements and anti-elements rather than literals
and propositions. It is straightforward to define more connectives within such sys-
tems, and it is also possible to define structured normative systems where the abstract
elements are instantiated with logical formulas, for example with formulas of a propo-
sitional or modal logic. The latter more interesting representation of logical structure
is analogous to the use of abstract arguments in formal argumentation. An advantage
of abstract normative systems over structured ones is that the central inference of de-
tachment can be visualized by walking paths in the graph. In other words, inference is
represented by graph reachability. For example, in the Order puzzle, node o is reach-
able from the context, and thus it can be detached. Moreover, a conflict is represented
by a node where both its light and the dark side are reachable from the context, as in
the case of node o in Figure 1.
There are several optional inference patterns for abstract normative systems, be-
cause, as is well known, most principles of deontic logic have been criticized for some
examples and applications. However, the absence of the same inference patterns is of-
ten criticized as well due to the lack of explanations and predictions of the detachment
procedures resulting from these patterns. Therefore, current approaches to represent
and reason with normative systems, such as input/output logic as well as abstract nor-
mative systems, do not restrict themselves to a single logic, but define a family of
logics which can be embedded within them. Deciding which logic to use in a specific
context depends on the requirements of the application. Similarly, with regards to per-
missions, there is an even larger diversity of deontic logics [15] which adopt different
representations. For example, for each input/output logic, various notions of permis-
sion have been defined, in terms of their relation to obligation. We refer to the work
of Parent and van der Torre [24] for further explanation, discussion and motivation of
this topic.
Now let us consider how various detachment procedures might apply norms in
hierarchical normative systems in different orders, and result in different outcomes or
extensions. Since detachment operates differently over permissions and obligations,
and since the former introduces significant extra complexity, we only consider regula-
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tive norms and obligation detachment procedures in this paper. We examine three ap-
proaches describing well known procedures defined in the literature [32,5,14]. These
procedures all share one important property, namely that the context itself is not nec-
essarily part of the procedure’s output. It is precisely this feature which distinguishes
input/output logics from traditional rule based languages like logic programming or
default logic [26,6]. Such traditional rule based languages where the input is part of
the output are called throughput operators in input/output logic research. Therefore,
the procedures we consider can naturally be captured using input/output logics. We
refer to the three approaches as Greedy, Reduction and Optimization.
Greedy: The context contains propositions that are known to hold. This procedure
always applies the norm with the highest priority that does not introduce inconsistency
to an extension and the context. Here we say that a norm is applicable when its body is
in the context or has been produced by other norms and added to the extension. In the
Order puzzle example, we begin with the context {w}, and (w,¬o) is first applied.
Then (w, h) is applied. Finally, (h, o) cannot be applied as this would result in a
conflict, and so, by using Greedy, we obtain the extension {h,¬o}.
Reduction: in this approach, a candidate extension is guessed. All norms that
are applicable according to this candidate extension are selected and transformed into
unconditional or body-free norms. For example, a norm (a, b) selected in this way is
transformed to a norm (>, b). The modified hierarchical abstract normative system,
with the transformed norms is then evaluated using Greedy. The candidate extension
is selected as an extension by Reduction if it is identified as an extension according
to this application of Greedy. In our example, we select a candidate extension {h, o},
obtaining a set of body-free norms {(>, h), (>,¬o), (>, o)}. The priorities assigned
to these norms are carried through from the original hierarchical abstract normative
system, and are therefore respectively 1, 2 and 3. After applying Greedy, we get an
extension of Reduction: {h, o}. However, if we had selected the candidate extension
{h,¬o}, then this new extension would not appear in Greedy as (>,¬o) has a lower
priority than (>, o), and the latter is therefore not an extension of Reduction.
Optimization: In terms of Hansen’s prioritized conditional imperatives, a set of
maximally obeyable (i.e., minimally violated) norms is selected by choosing norms
in order of priority which are consistent with the context. Once these norms are se-
lected, Greedy is applied to identify the extension. In our example, the maximal set
of obeyable norms is {(h, o), (w,¬o)}. Optimization therefore detaches the unique
extension {¬o}.
We can also consider the example in terms of formal argumentation. Given a hi-
erarchical abstract normative system, we may construct an argumentation framework.
The top part of Figure 2 illustrates the argumentation framework obtained for the Or-
der puzzle which does not consider the priority relation between arguments.
An argumentation framework is a directed graph in which nodes denote argu-
ments, and edges denote attacks between arguments. In the setting of a hierarchical
abstract normative system, an argument is represented as a path within the directed
graph starting from a node in the context. In this example, there are four arguments
A0, A1, A2 and A3, represented as [w], [(w, h)], [(w, h), (h, o)] and [(w,¬o)], respec-
tively. Since the conclusions of A2 and A3 are inconsistent, A2 attacks A3 and vice-
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A0
[w]
A1
[(w,h)]
A2
[(w,h),(h,o)]
A3
[(w,¬o)]
A0
[w]
A1
[(w,h)]
A2
[(w,h),(h,o)]
A3
[(w,¬o)]
A0
[w]
A1
[(w,h)]
A2
[(w,h),(h,o)]
A3
[(w,¬o)]
Fig. 2. Top: the argumentation framework obtained from the order puzzle hierarchical norma-
tive system with the four arguments and attacks between them visualized as directed arrows.
Middle: the argumentation framework obtained when last link is applied. Bottom: the argu-
mentation framework obtained when weakest link is applied.
versa. To obtain correct conclusions, we must take priorities between arguments into
account, transforming attacks into defeats. This in turn requires lifting the priorities
given for the constituents of an argument to a priority for the argument itself, and two
different principles have been commonly used for such a lifting. The last link prin-
ciple ranks an argument based on the strength of its last inference, while the weakest
link principle ranks an argument based on the strength of its weakest inference. In
the order example, if the last link principle is applied, then [(w, h), (h, o)] defeats
[(w,¬o)]. The corresponding argumentation framework is illustrated in the middle
portion of Figure 2. If the weakest link principle is used instead, then [(w,¬o)] de-
feats [(w, h), (h, o)]. The corresponding argumentation framework is illustrated at the
bottom of Figure 2. As a result, the former principle allows us to conclude {h, o},
while the latter concludes {h,¬o}. In turn, the first result coincides with that obtained
by Reduction, while the second is the same as that obtained by Greedy.
Inspired by the example above, we wish to investigate the links between the three
detachment procedures for prioritized normative reasoning and argumentation theory.
More specifically, our main research question is as follows.
How can the three detachment procedures (Reduction, Greedy, and Optimization)
proposed in the context of abstract normative reasoning be represented in formal
argumentation?
To answer this research question, we propose a formal framework to connect hier-
archical normative reasoning with argumentation theory. More precisely, our frame-
work represents the above-mentioned detachment procedures by lifting priorities from
norms to arguments, with the underlying goal of making as few commitments as pos-
sible to specific argumentation systems. For this reason, we build on a structured
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argumentation framework which admits undercuts and rebuts between arguments, and
allows for priorities between norms making up arguments. We show that variants
of approaches to lifting priorities from rules to arguments allow us to capture both
Greedy and Reduction, while the introduction of additional defeats allows us to ob-
tain Optimization.
Some preliminary results found in this paper were originally presented in DEON
2016 [19]. We keep, but extend, the representation results for Greedy and Reduction
(previously called the “Brewka-Eiter construction”). To capture Optimization (pre-
viously called “Hansen’s construction”) the DEON 2016 paper adds new arguments
through the introduction of additional permissive norms. In the current paper, this is
replaced with an approach which introduces additional defeats. The reasons for this
replacement are two-fold. First, the preliminary approaches for Optimization from
the earlier work [19] cannot fully capture the idea that each argument containing a
norm not belonging to the maximal obeyable set should be rejected. Second, per-
missive norms were used as a means to support the representation, which making the
approach more complicated.
The layout of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 formalizes the
above-mentioned three detachment procedures of hierarchical normative reasoning
(i.e., Greedy, Reduction, and Optimization). In Section 3, we introduce an argumenta-
tion theory for a hierarchical abstract normative system. Sections 4, 5 and 6 show how
Greedy, Reduction and Optimization can be represented in argumentation. Finally, in
Section 7 we discuss open problems and compare the proposed approach with related
work, and in Section 8 we point out possible directions for future work.
2 Hierarchical abstract normative systems
In this section, we formally introduce the notion of hierarchical abstract normative sys-
tems and the three detachment procedures to compute their normative conclusions. A
hierarchical abstract normative system captures the context of a system and the norms
in force in such a system. There is an element in the universe called >, contained in
every context. In this paper, we consider only a finite universe. A hierarchical ab-
stract normative system also encodes a ranking function over the norms to allow for
the resolution of conflicts.
Based on the notion of abstract normative system defined by Tosatto et al. [28], a
hierarchical abstract normative system can be defined as follows.
Definition 2.1 [Hierarchical abstract normative system] A hierarchical abstract nor-
mative system is a tupleH = 〈L,N,C, r〉, where
• L = E ∪ {¬e | e ∈ E} ∪ {>} is the universe, a set of literals based on some finite
set E of atomic elements;
• N ⊆ L× L is a finite set of regulative norms;
• C ⊆ L is a subset of the universe, called a context, such that > ∈ C and for all e in
E, {e,¬e} 6⊆ C;
• r : N → IN is a function from norms to natural numbers.
Regulative (ordinary) norms are of the kind “if you turn on the heat, then you
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should open the window”. These norms are conditional norms, requiring some condi-
tion to hold (e.g., turning on the heat) before their conclusions can be drawn.
We write (a, x) for a regulative norm, where a, x ∈ L are the antecedent and
conclusion of the norm, respectively. Given (a, x), we use r(a, x) to denote r((a, x)).
Let u, v ∈ N be two norms, we say that v is at least as preferred as u (denoted u ≤ v)
if and only if r(u) is not larger than r(v) (denoted r(u) ≤ r(v)), where r(u) is also
called the rank of u. We write u < v or v > u if and only if u ≤ v and v 6≤ u. Given
a norm u = (a, x), we write ant(u) for a to represent the antecedent of the norm,
and cons(u) for x to represent the consequent of the norm. Given a set of norms
S ⊆ N , we use cons(S) to denote {cons(u) | u ∈ S}. We say that a hierarchical
abstract normative system is totally ordered if and only if the ordering ≤ over N is
antisymmetric, transitive and total. Due to the finiteness of universe, the set of norms
is finite. Note that given this assumption, the notion of total ordering here is identical
to that of the full prioritization in Brewka and Eiter’s [7] and Hansen’s [13] work, and
of the linearized ordering of Young et al. [32]. For a ∈ L, we write a = ¬a if and only
if a ∈ E, and a = e for e ∈ E if and only if a = ¬e. For a set S ⊆ L, we say that S is
consistent if and only if there exist no e1, e2 ∈ S such that e1 = e2. To exemplify the
notions of a hierarchical abstract normative system, consider the following example.
Example 2.2 [Order puzzle] In terms of Definition 2.1, the set of norms and priorities
that are visualized in Figure 1 can be formally represented as a hierarchical abstract
normative system H = 〈L,N , C, r〉, where L = {w, h, o,¬w,¬h,¬o,>}, N =
{(w, h), (h, o), (w,¬o)}, C = {w,>}, r(w, h) = 1, r(h, o) = 3, r(w,¬o) = 2.
In the hierarchical abstract normative system setting, the three detachment proce-
dures for prioritized normative reasoning can be defined as follows.
Firstly, Greedy detachment for a hierarchical abstract normative system always
applies the norm with the highest priority among those which can be applied, if this
does not bring inconsistency to the extension and the context. To formally define
the notion of Greedy, we first introduce the following notions of paths and consistent
paths.
Definition 2.3 [Path, consistent path] LetH = 〈L, N,C, r〉 be a hierarchical abstract
normative system.
• A path in H from x1 to xn is a sequence of norms (x1, x2), (x2, x3),
. . . , (xn−1, xn) such that {(x1, x2), (x2, x3), . . . , (xn−1, xn)} ⊆ N , n ≥ 2, and
all norms of the sequence are distinct.
• A path in H from x1 to xn with respect to R ⊆ N is a sequence of
norms (x1, x2), (x2, x3), . . . , (xn−1, xn) such that {(x1, x2), (x2, x3), . . . , (xn−1,
xn)} ⊆ R, n ≥ 2, and all norms of the sequence are distinct.
• A consistent path in H from x1 to xn (with respect to R) is a path
(x1, x2), (x2, x3), . . . , (xn−1, xn) such that {x1, x2, . . . , xn} is consistent.
Then, the unique extension of a totally ordered hierarchical abstract normative
system by Greedy can be defined as follows by first selecting a set of applicable norms
with the highest priority in each step, and then collecting the final vertex of each path
with respect to the set of selected norms.
8 Prioritized Norms in Formal Argumentation
Definition 2.4 [Greedy] Let H = 〈L, N,C, r〉 be a totally ordered hierarchical ab-
stract normative system. For all R ⊆ N , let R(C) = {x | there is a path in H from
an element in C to x with respect to R}, and Appl(N,C,R) := {(a, x) ∈ N \ R |
a ∈ C ∪ cons(R), {x, x}6⊆ C ∪ cons(R)}. The extension ofH by Greedy, written as
Greedy(H), is the set R(C) such that R = ∪∞i=0Ri is built inductively as follows.
R0 = ∅
Ri+1 =Ri ∪max(N,C,Ri, r)
where max(N,C,Ri, r) = {u ∈ Appl(N,C,Ri) | ∀v ∈ Appl(N,C,Ri) : r(u) ≥
r(v)}.
In terms of Definition 2.4, the unique extension of the Order puzzle can be con-
structed as follows.
Example 2.5 [Extension by Greedy] Given H in Example 2.2, by Greedy, it holds
that R0 = ∅, R1 = {(w,¬o)}, R2 = {(w,¬o), (w, h)}, R = {(w,¬o), (w, h)}. So,
Greedy(H) = {h,¬o}.
Reduction is defined by first using a candidate extension to get a modified hier-
archical abstract normative system, and then applying Greedy to it. If the candidate
extension is an extension according to this application of Greedy, then it is an exten-
sion of the original hierarchical abstract normative system by Reduction. Formally,
we have the following definition.
Definition 2.6 [Reduction] Given a totally ordered hierarchical abstract normative
system H = 〈L,N , C, r〉, and a set X , let HX=〈L,N ′, C, r′〉, where N ′ =
{(>, x2) | (x1, x2) ∈ N, x1 ∈ C ∪X} is the set of ordinary norms, and r′(>, x2) =
max(r(x1, x2) | (x1, x2) ∈ N, x1 ∈ C ∪X) for all (x1, x2) ∈ N are priorities over
norms. An extension of H by Reduction is a set U such that U is Greedy(HU ). The
set of extensions ofH by Reduction is denoted as Reduction(H).
According to Definition 2.6, it can be the case that different norms have the same
consequent. To avoid the duplication of multiple body-free norms, only a single norm
with the highest priority is used.
To exemplify the notion of Reduction, consider again the Order puzzle in Exam-
ple 2.2.
Example 2.7 [Extensions by Reduction] By using Reduction, given X = {h, o}, we
have HX = 〈L,N ′, C, r′〉, where N ′ = {(>, h), (>, o), (>,¬o)}, r′(>, h) = 1,
r′(>, o) = 3 and r′(>,¬o) = 2. Since X ∈ Greedy(HX), and no other set can be an
extension, we have that Reduction(H) = {{h, o}}.
Note that a totally ordered hierarchical abstract normative system might have more
than one extension, as illustrated by the following example.
Example 2.8 [Multiple extensions by Reduction] Given the hierarchical abstract nor-
mative system in Figure 3, assume that we have a context C = {a}. We then consider
X1 = {b, c} and X2 = {¬b}. In the first case, we have HX1 = 〈L,N ′, C, r′〉 where
N ′ = {(>, b), (>,¬b), (>, c)} and r′(>, b) = 4, r′(>, c) = 3, r′(>,¬b) = 2. Here,
Greedy(HX1) = {b, c}, i.e., X1.
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In the second case, we obtain HX2 = 〈L,N ′, C, r′〉 where N ′ =
{(>, b), (>,¬b)} and r′(>, b) = 1, r′(>,¬b) = 2. Now, Greedy(HX2) = {¬b},
i.e., X2. In this case, we therefore obtain two extensions using Reduction.
a b c
T 1
2
3
4 1: (a,b)
2: (a,¬b)
3: (b,c)
4: (c,b)
Fig. 3. The hierarchical abstract normative system of Example 2.7 containing the two Reduc-
tion extensions {b, c} and {¬b}.
Finally, Optimization can be defined by first choosing a set of maximally obeyable
norms, and then applying Greedy to it.
Definition 2.9 [Optimization] Given a totally ordered hierarchical abstract normative
systemH = 〈L,N , C, r〉, let T = (u1, u2, . . . , un) be the linear order onN such that
u1 > u2 > · · · > un. We define a sequence of sets of norms R0 . . . Rn as follows:
R0 = ∅
Ri+1 =
{
Ri ∪ {ui}, if C ∪R(C) is consistent where R = Ri ∪ {ui}
Ri, else
The unique extension of H by Optimization is Rn(C) and denoted as
Optimization(H).
According to Definition 2.9, the unique extension of the Order puzzle can be con-
structed as follows.
Example 2.10 [Extension by Optimization] Regarding H in Example 2.2, by Opti-
mization, let u1 = (h, o), u2 = (w, ¬o), and u3 = (w, h), and T = (u1, u2, u3).
Then, it holds that R0 = ∅, R1 = {u1}, R2 = {u1, u2}, and R = R3 = R2 =
{u1, u2}. So, we obtain that Optimization(H) = {¬o}.
3 Argumentation theory for a hierarchical abstract normative
system
In this section, we introduce an argumentation theory on prioritized norms. Given a
hierarchical abstract normative system, we first define arguments and defeats between
them, then compute extensions of arguments in terms of Dung’s theory [10], and from
these, obtain conclusions.
3.1 Arguments
In a hierarchical abstract normative system, an argument is an acyclic path in the graph
starting in an element of the context. We assume minimal arguments—no norm can be
applied twice in an argument and no redundant norm is included in an argument. We
use concl(α) to denote the conclusion of an argument α, and concl(E) = {concl(α) |
α ∈ E} for the conclusions of a set of arguments E.
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Definition 3.1 [Arguments and sub-arguments] Let H = 〈L,N,C, r〉 be a hierarchi-
cal abstract normative system.
A context argument inH is an element a ∈ C, and its conclusion is concl(a) = a.
An ordinary argument is a consistent path α in H from x ∈ C to some y ∈ L.
Moreover, we have that concl(α) = y.
The sub-arguments of argument [u1, . . . , un] are, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, [u1, . . . , ui]. Note
that context arguments do not have sub-arguments.
The set of all arguments constructed fromH is denoted as Arg(H). For readability,
[(a1, a2), . . . , (an−1, an)] may be written as (a1, a2, . . . , an−1, an). The set of sub-
arguments of an argument α is denoted as sub(α). When α is a sub-argument of β,
we say that β is a super-argument of α. The set of super-arguments of α is denoted as
sup(α). Furthermore, the set of proper sub-arguments of α is defined as psub(α) =
sub(α) \ {α}. For an ordinary argument α = [u1, . . . , un], we call un the top norm
of α. Finally, in each ordinary argument, the norm with lowest priority is called the
weakest norm of the argument. Formally, we have the following definition for this
latter concept.
Definition 3.2 [The weakest norm of an argument] LetH be a totally ordered hierar-
chical abstract normative system. For an ordinary argument α = [u1, . . . , un] inH, if
r(ui) = min(r(uj) | 1 ≤ j ≤ n), then ui is called the weakest norm of α.
3.2 Defeat relation between arguments
We follow the tradition in much of preference-based argumentation [2,21], where at-
tack captures a relation among arguments which ignores preferences, and defeat is a
preference-aware relation on which the semantics is based. To define the defeat rela-
tion among prioritized arguments, we assume that only the priorities of the norms are
used to compare arguments. In other words, we assume a lifting of the ordering on
norms to a binary relation on sequences of norms (i.e., arguments), written as α  β,
where α and β are two arguments, indicating that α is at least as preferred as β.
There is no common agreement about the best way to lift ≥ to . In argumenta-
tion, there are at least two ways to introduce weights. As an argumentation framework
consists of a set of arguments and an attack relation between them, we can either as-
sign weights to arguments, or we can assign weights to attacks. Traditionally, weights
are assigned to arguments. Two common approaches to give the strength of an argu-
ment are the weakest link and the last link principles, combined with the elitist and
democratic ordering [21]. For example, in the weakest link principle the weight of the
argument is the weight of the weakest rule used in the argument. However, Young et
al. [32] showed that elitist weakest link cannot be used to calculate  for Greedy, and
proposes a disjoint elitist order which ignores shared rules. It is worth noticing that
the strength of an argument may depend on the argument it is attacking, as identified
by Young et al. [32]. Based on this idea, we define the orderings between arguments
by assigning a strength to the attacks between the arguments, to reflect the priority of
the norms used in the arguments, following the same insights of the weakest link and
last link principles (denoted as w and l respectively). Defining the weakest link
ordering in the same way as Young et al. [32], we have the following definition.
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Definition 3.3 [Weakest link and last link] Let H = 〈L,N , C, r〉 be a hierarchical
abstract normative system, and α = [u1, . . . , un] and β = [v1, . . . , vm] be two argu-
ments in Arg(H). Let Φ1 = {u1, . . . , un} and Φ2 = {v1, . . . , vm}. By the weakest
link principle, α w β iff ∃v ∈ Φ2 \ Φ1 such that ∀u ∈ Φ1 \ Φ2, v ≤ u. By the last
link principle, α l β iff un ≥ vm.
When the context is clear, we write  for w, or l. We write α  β for α  β
without β  α. The following proposition shows the transitivity of the two relations
w and l.
Proposition 3.4 (Transitivity) It holds that the relations w and l are transitive.
Proof. Let α = [u1, . . . , un], β = [v1, . . . , vm] and γ = [w1, . . . , wk] be three
arguments in Arg(H). For the case of the weakest link, let Φ1 = {u1, . . . , un},
Φ2 = {v1, . . . , vm}, and Φ3 = {w1, . . . , wk}, n,m, k ≥ 1. Let x12 ∈ Φ1 ∩ Φ2,
x13 ∈ Φ1 ∩Φ3, and x23 ∈ Φ2 ∪Φ3, x1 ∈ Φ1 \ (Φ2 ∪Φ3), x2 ∈ Φ2 \ (Φ1 ∪Φ3), and
x3 ∈ Φ3 \ (Φ1∪Φ2). Assume that α w β and β w γ. There are only the following
four possible cases.
Case 1: There exists x23 ∈ Φ2, for all x13, x1 ∈ Φ1, x23 ≤ x13 and x23 ≤ x1; and
since x13 ∈ Φ3, assume that for all x12, x2 ∈ Φ2, x13 ≤ x12, x13 ≤ x2. It follows
that x23 ≤ x12 and x23 ≤ x1. Since x23 ∈ Φ3, it means that there exists x23 ∈ Φ3
such that x23 ≤ x12 and x23 ≤ x1 where x12, x1 ∈ Φ1. Hence, α w γ.
Case 2: There exist x23 ∈ Φ2 and x3 ∈ Φ3, for all x13, x1 ∈ Φ1, and x12, x2 ∈
Φ2: x23 ≤ x13, x23 ≤ x1, x3 ≤ x12, x3 ≤ x2. In this case, there are in turn only
the following two possible sub-cases: either x23 ≤ x3 or x23 > x3. If x23 ≤ x3,
since x3 ≤ x12, it holds that x23 ≤ x12. Since x23 ≤ x1 and x23 ≤ x12, it holds
that α w γ. Second, if x23 > x3, since x23 ≤ x1, x3 ≤ x1. Since x3 ≤ x12 and
x3 ≤ x1, α w γ.
Case 3: There exists x2 ∈ Φ2, for all x13, x1 ∈ Φ1, x2 ≤ x13 and x2 ≤ x1; and
since x13 ∈ Φ3, assume that for all x12, x2 ∈ Φ2, x13 ≤ x12, x13 ≤ x2. In this case,
there are in turn only the following two possible sub-cases: x23 ≤ x13 or x3 ≤ x13,
or x23 > x13 and x3 > x13. If x23 ≤ x13 and x3 ≤ x13, it holds that α w γ.
If x23 > x13 and x3 > x13, it holds that x13 < x23 and x13 ≤ x2, and therefore
β w α. Contradiction.
Case 4: There exist x2 ∈ Φ2 and x3 ∈ Φ3, for all x13, x1 ∈ Φ1, and x12, x2 ∈ Φ2:
x2 ≤ x13, x2 ≤ x1, x3 ≤ x12, x3 ≤ x2. In this case, since x3 ≤ x12 and x3 ≤ x1, it
holds that α w γ.
For last link, if α l β and β l γ, then un ≥ vm and vm ≥ wk. It follows that
un ≥ wk, and therefore α l γ. So, it holds that l is transitive. 2
Given a way to lift the ordering on norms to an ordering on arguments, the notion
of defeat can be defined as follows.
Definition 3.5 [Defeat among arguments] Let H = 〈L,N , C, r〉 be a hierarchical
abstract normative system. For all α, β ∈ Arg(H),
α attacks β iff β has a sub-argument β′ such that
(i) concl(α) = concl(β′)
α defeats β iff β has a sub-argument β′ such that
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(i) concl(α) = concl(β′) and
(ii) α is a context argument; or α is an ordinary argument and α  β.
The set of defeats between the arguments in Arg(H) based on a preference order-
ing  is denoted as Def(H,).
In what follows, an argument α = [u1, . . . , un] with ranking on norms is denoted
as u1 . . . un : r(α), where r(α) = (r(u1), . . . , r(un)).
The notions of arguments and defeat relations between arguments by the weak-
est link and the last link principles respectively can be illustrated by the following
example.
Example 3.6 [Order puzzle continued] Consider the hierarchical abstract normative
system in Example 2.2. We have the following arguments (visually presented in the
top of Figure 2):
A0 : w (context argument)
A1 : (w, h) : (1) (ordinary argument)
A2 : (w, h)(h, o) : (1, 3) (ordinary argument)
A3 : (w,¬o) : (2) (ordinary argument)
We have that A2 attacks A3 and vice versa, and there are no other attacks among the
arguments. Moreover, A2 defeats A3 by the last link principle (Figure 2, middle), and
A3 defeats A2 by the weakest link principle (Figure 2, bottom).
3.3 Argument extensions and conclusion extensions
Given a set of argumentsA = Arg(H) and a set of defeatsR = Def(H,), we get an
argumentation framework (AF) F = (A,R).
Following the notions of abstract argumentation by Dung [10], we say that a set
B ⊆ A is admissible, if and only if it is conflict-free and it can defend each argument
within the set. A set B ⊆ A is conflict-free if and only if there exist no arguments α
and β in B such that (α, β) ∈ R. Argument α ∈ A is defended by a set B ⊆ A (in
such a situation α can also be said to be acceptable with respect to B) if and only if
for all β ∈ A, if (β, α) ∈ R, then there exists γ ∈ B such that (γ, β) ∈ R. Based
on the notion of admissible sets, some other extensions can be defined. Formally, we
have the following.
Definition 3.7 [Conflict-freeness, defense and extensions] Let F = (A,R) be an
argumentation framework, and B ⊆ A a set of arguments.
• B is conflict-free if and only if @α, β ∈ B, such that (α, β) ∈ R.
• An argument α ∈ A is defended by B (equivalently α is acceptable with respect to
B), if and only if ∀(β, α) ∈ R, ∃γ ∈ B, such that (γ, β) ∈ R.
• B is admissible if and only ifB is conflict-free, and each argument inB is defended
by B.
• B is a complete extension if and only if B is admissible and each argument in A
that is defended by B is in B.
• B is a preferred extension if and only if B is a maximal (with respect to set-
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inclusion) complete extension.
• B is a grounded extension if and only if B is the minimal (with respect to set-
inclusion) complete extension.
• B is a stable extension if and only if B is conflict-free, and ∀α ∈ A \ B, ∃β ∈ B
such that (β, α) ∈ R.
A semantics describes the set of extensions one wishes to obtain. We use sem ∈
{cmp, prf, grd, stb} to denote the complete, preferred, grounded, and stable semantics,
respectively. A set of argument extensions of F = (A,R) is denoted as sem(F). We
write Outfamily for the set of conclusions from the extensions of the argumentation
theory [30].
Definition 3.8 [Conclusion extensions] Given a hierarchical abstract normative sys-
tem H = 〈L,N,C, r〉, let F = (Arg(H),Def(H,)) be the AF constructed from H.
The conclusion extensions, written as Outfamily(F , sem), are the conclusions of the
ordinary arguments within argument extensions.
Outfamily(F , sem) = {{concl(α) | α ∈ S, α is an ordinary argument} | S ∈ sem(F)}
The following example shows that for a hierarchical abstract normative system,
when adopting different principles for lifting the priorities over norms to those over
arguments, the resulting argumentation frameworks as well as their conclusion exten-
sions may be different.
Example 3.9 [Order puzzle in argumentation] According to Example 3.6, let A =
{A0, . . . , A3}. We have F1 = (A, {(A2, A3)}) where A2 l A3, and F2 = (A,
{(A3, A2)}) where A3 w A2. For all sem ∈ {cmp, prf, grd, stb}, Outfamily(F1,
sem) = {{h, o}}, and Outfamily(F2, sem) = {{h,¬o}}.
We now turn our attention to the properties of the argumentation theory for a hier-
archical abstract normative system.
First, according to Definition 3.5, we have the following proposition, capturing the
relation between the attack/defeat on an argument and on its super-arguments.
Proposition 3.10 (Super-argument attack and defeat) Let F = (A,R) be an AF
constructed from a hierarchical abstract normative system. For all α, β ∈ A, if α
attacks β, then α attacks all super-arguments of β; if α defeats β, α defeats all super-
arguments of β.
Proof. When α attacks β, according to Definition 3.5, β has a sub-argument β′ such
that concl(α) = concl(β′). Let γ be an super-argument of β. It follows that β′ is a
sub-argument of γ. Hence, α attacks γ.
When α defeats β, according to Definition 3.5, β has a sub-argument β′ such that
concl(α) = concl(β′) and α is a context argument; or α is an ordinary argument and
α  β′, Since β′ is a sub-argument of γ, α defeats γ. 2
Second, corresponding to properties of sub-argument closure and direct consis-
tency in ASPIC+ [21], we have the following two properties.
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Proposition 3.11 (Closure under sub-arguments) Let F = (A,R) be an AF
constructed from a hierarchical abstract normative system. For all sem ∈
{cmp, prf, grd, stb}, ∀E ∈ sem(F), if an argument α ∈ E, then sub(α) ⊆ E.
Proof. For every β ∈ sub(α), since α is acceptable with respect to E, it holds that β
is acceptable with respect to E. This is because for each γ ∈ R, if γ defeats β, then
according to Proposition 3.10, γ defeats α; since α ∈ E, there exists an η ∈ E such
that η defeats γ. Given that β is acceptable with respect to E and E is a complete
extension, it holds that β ∈ E. 2
Since all norms in a hierarchical abstract normative system are defeasible, we only
need to discuss direct consistency and contextual consistency.
Proposition 3.12 (Direct consistency) Let F = (A,R) be an AF constructed from
a hierarchical abstract normative system. For all sem ∈ {cmp, prf, grd, stb}, ∀E ∈
sem(F), {concl(α) | α ∈ E,α is an ordinary argument} is consistent.
Proof. Assume that there exist α, β ∈ E such that concl(α) = concl(β). Since both
α and β are ordinary arguments, α attacks β, and β attacks α. If α  β then α defeats
β. Otherwise, β defeats α. In both cases, E is not conflict-free, contradicting the fact
that E is a complete extension. 2
Proposition 3.13 (Contextual consistency) Let F = (A,R) be an AF con-
structed from a hierarchical abstract normative system H = 〈L,N,C, r〉. For
all sem ∈ {cmp, prf, grd, stb}, ∀E ∈ sem(F), C ∪ {concl(α) | α ∈
E,α is an ordinary argument} is consistent.
Proof. Since C is consistent, we only need to verify that for all a ∈ C, for all α ∈ E,
{a, concl(α)} is consistent. We use proof by contradiction. Assume the contrary, i.e.,
concl(α) = a. It follows that a defeats α, and therefore α /∈ E. Contradiction. So
the assumption is false, i.e., C ∪ {concl(α) | α ∈ E,α is an ordinary argument} is
consistent. This completes the proof. 2
In the next sections, we present representation results for the Greedy, Reduction
and Optimization approaches introduced in Section 2, identifying equivalences be-
tween these approaches and the argument semantics based descriptions of a hierarchi-
cal abstract normative system.
4 Representation results for Greedy
Based on the idea introduced in Section 1, for a totally ordered hierarchical abstract
normative system, we have the following lemma and proposition.
Lemma 4.1 (Unique extension of Greedy) Given a totally ordered hierarchical ab-
stract normative system H = 〈L, N,C, r〉 and the corresponding argumentation
framework F = (Arg(H), Def(H,w)), it holds that F is acyclic, and therefore
has a unique extension under stable semantics.
Proof. Since H is totally ordered, under w, the relation w among arguments is
acyclic. Assume the contrary. Then, there exist three distinct α, β, γ ∈ Arg(H) such
that α w β, β w γ and γ w α. According to Definition 3.3, when H is totally
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ordered, it holds that α w β, β w γ and γ w α. According to Proposition 3.4,
α w γ, contradicting γ w α. Hence, F is acyclic, and therefore has a unique
extension under stable semantics.
Proposition 4.2 (Greedy is weakest link) Given a totally ordered hierarchical ab-
stract normative system H = 〈L, N,C, r〉 and the corresponding argumenta-
tion framework F = (Arg(H), Def(H,w)), it holds that {Greedy(H)} =
Outfamily(F , stb).
Proof. Our proof is constructive: given the Greedy extension, we show how to con-
struct a stable extension of the argumentation framework whose conclusions coincide
with the Greedy extension. Since the argumentation framework has only one extension
(Lemma 4.2), this completes the proof.
By Definition 2.4., Greedy(H) is the set of elements x such that there is a path inH
from an element inC to x with respect to a set of normsR ⊆ N , inductively defined by
R = ∪∞i=0Ri, whereR0 = ∅ andRi+1 = Ri∪max(N,C,Ri, r), max(N,C,Ri, r) =
{u ∈ Appl(N,C,Ri) | ∀v ∈ Appl(N,C,Ri) : r(u) ≥ r(v)} and Appl(N,C,R) :=
{(a, x) ∈ N \R | a ∈ C∪ cons(R), {x, x}6⊆ C ∪ cons(R)}.
Let E = {a ∈ Arg (H) | a ∈ C is a context argument} ∪ {[u1, . . . , un] ∈
Arg(H) | n ≥ 1, ant(u1) ∈ C, {ant(u2) . . . , ant(un), cons(un)} ⊆ Greedy(H)}.
From the consistency of the extensions (Proposition 3.11) and the construction of
Greedy we know that there is a consistent path to any element of Greedy(H), and thus
for any argument of Greedy(H) there is an ordinary argument with that element as its
conclusion, and thus Greedy(H) = {concl(α) | α ∈ E,α is an ordinary argument}.
Now we only need to prove that E is a stable extension under weakest link.
We use proof by contradiction. Assume that E is not a stable extension. Given
that Greedy(H) is consistent, and thus the extension E is conflict free, and given that
context arguments defeat all conflicting ordinary arguments and are thus included in
E, there must be α = [u1, . . . , un] ∈ Arg(H) \ E, such that α is not defeated by
any argument in E. Since α /∈ E, there exist α′ = [u1, . . . , uj−1] ∈ E and α′′ =
[u1, . . . , uj ] 6∈ E. Let S ⊆ E be the set of arguments conflicting with α′′, thus each of
them has a conclusion cons(uj). So, α′′ defeats each argument β = [v1, . . . , vm] in
S using weakest link, i.e. α′′ w β. If Φ1 = {u1, . . . , un} and Φ2 = {v1, . . . , vm},
then according to Def 3.2, ∃v ∈ Φ2 \Φ1 such that ∀u ∈ Φ1 \Φ2, v ≤ u. Let M ⊆ N
be the set of all these norms v, i.e. all norms that occur in the arguments of S which
are smaller than all the norms in α′′, excluding norms that occur in α′′ itself.
We now consider the point in the construction of the greedy extension where an
element of M was added to it, we consider Appl(N,C,R) and max(N,C,Ri, r),
and we derive the contradiction. Let i be the lowest index such that Ri does not
contain a norm of M . At this moment, Appl(N,C,Ri) also contains a norm in α′′,
and max(N,C,Ri, r) contains an element of M . However, by definition, all norms of
M are ranked lower than the norms in α′′. Contradiction. So the assumption is false,
i.e. E is a stable extension. This completes the proof.
Note that Proposition 4.2 corresponds to Theorem 5.3 of Young et al.[32]. This
correspondence arises as follows. First, in the argumentation theory for a hierarchical
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abstract normative system, we use disjoint elitist order to compare sets of norms, while
in the argumentation theory for prioritized default logic, Young et al. use a new order
called a structure-preference order, which takes into account the structure of how argu-
ments are constructed. Since in the setting of hierarchical abstract normative systems,
arguments are acyclic paths, it is not necessary to use the structure-preference order to
compare arguments. Second, due to the different ways of constructing argumentation
frameworks, the proof of Proposition 4.2 differs from that of Theorem 5.3 of Young
et al. [32]. The former considers the order of the applicability of norms in the proof,
while the latter uses the mechanism defined in the structure-preference order.
5 Representation result for Reduction
According to Brewka and Eiter [7], Reduction is based on the following two points.
1) The application of a rule with nonmonotonic assumptions means jumping to a
conclusion. This conclusion is yet another assumption which has to be used globally
in the program for the issue of deciding whether a rule is applicable or not.
2) The rules must be applied in an order compatible with the priority information.
This global view of deciding whether a rule is applicable coincides with the last-
link principle of lifting a preference relation between rules to a priority relation be-
tween resulting arguments. According to Definition 2.6 and the argumentation theory
for a hierarchical abstract normative system, we have the following representation
result.
Proposition 5.1 (Reduction is last link) Given a totally ordered hierarchical ab-
stract normative system H = 〈L,N,C, r〉 and the corresponding argumenta-
tion framework F = (Arg(H), Def(H,l)), it holds that Reduction(H) =
Outfamily(F , stb).
Proof. We prove Reduction(H) = Outfamily(F , stb). by first proving that the left
hand side is a subset of the right hand side, and then by proving that the right hand
side is a subset of the left hand side.
We first prove Reduction(H) ⊆ Outfamily(F , stb).
Assume a set U ∈ Reduction(H). According to Definition 2.6 we have
Greedy(HU ) whereHX=〈L,N ′,C, r′〉,N ′ = {(>, x2) | (x1, x2) ∈ N, x1 ∈ C∪X}
is the set of ordinary norms, and r′(>, x2) = max(r(x1, x2) | (x1, x2) ∈ N, x1 ∈
C ∪X) for all (x1, x2) ∈ N are priorities over norms.
We now construct a stable extension of F such that its conclusions are exactly U .
Let E be the set of arguments that can be constructed from elements of U , just like
in the proof of Greedy. So E = {a ∈ Arg (H) | a ∈ C is a context argument} ∪
{[u1, . . . , un] ∈ Arg(H) | n ≥ 1, ant(u1) ∈ C, {ant(u2) . . . , ant(un), cons(un)} ⊆
U}. From the consistency of the extensions (Proposition 3.11) and the construction of
Reduction we know that there is a consistent path to any element of U , and thus for
any argument of U there is an ordinary argument with that element as its conclusion,
and thus U = {concl(α) | α ∈ E,α is an ordinary argument}. Now we only need to
prove that E is a stable extension.
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We use proof by contradiction, just like in the proof of Greedy. Assume thatE is not
stable. Given that context arguments defeat all conflicting ordinary arguments, there
must be a β = [v1, . . . , vn] ∈ Arg(H)\E, such that β is not defeated by any argument
in E. Since β /∈ E, there exists β′ = [v1, . . . , vj ] in E and β′′ = [v1, . . . , vj+1] not in
E. Let S ⊆ E be the set of arguments attacking β′′, thus each of them has a conclusion
cons(vj+1). Since β′′ is not defeated by any argument inE, β′′ defeats each argument
in S. Then, the last link of β′′ is higher than the last links of all arguments of S.
Consequently, the rank of vj+1 is higher than the rank of all norms with consequent
cons(vj+1). But this means that in N ′, the rank of (>, cons(vj+1)) is higher than the
rank of (>, cons(vj+1)). Then by the construction of Reduction, i.e., Greedy(HU ),
we have that cons(vj+1) must be in U , a contradiction. Thus the assumption is false,
i.e., E is stable, and this completes the proof that Reduction(H) ⊆ Outfamily(F , stb).
To complete our proof, we now show that Reduction(H) ⊇ Outfamily(F , stb).
Let E be a stable extension of F = (Arg(H), Def(H,l)). Thus E is conflict free,
closed under sub-arguments, and for all arguments not in E, there is an argument in
E defeating it. In particular, for any β′ = [v1, . . . , vj ] in E and β′′ = [v1, . . . , vj+1]
not in E, there is an argument in E defeating β′′.
Moreover, let U = {concl(α) | α ∈ E,α is an ordinary argument}. From the
contextual consistency of stable extensions (Proposition 3.12), we know that U ∪C is
consistent. Since defeat is based on last link, it means that for every norm applicable
in U whose conclusion c is not in U , there is a higher ranked norm applicable in U
whose conclusion is c. Consider HU=〈L,N ′, C, r′〉, N ′ = {(>, x2) | (x1, x2) ∈
N, x1 ∈ C ∪ U} is the set of ordinary norms, and r′(>, x2) = max(r(x1, x2) |
(x1, x2) ∈ N, x1 ∈ C ∪ U) for all (x1, x2) ∈ N are priorities over norms. Assume
there is an x ∈ U with (>, x), (>, x) ∈ N ′. Due to the above the rank of (>, x) is
higher than the rank of (>, x), and thus x ∈ Greedy(HU ).
Thus U = Greedy(HU ), i.e. U ∈ Reduction(H), and that completes our proof.
Now, let us consider the following three examples, which show that by Reduc-
tion, a hierarchical abstract normative system and the corresponding argumentation
framework may have a unique extension, multiple extensions, or an empty extension.
Example 5.2 [Order puzzle, Reduction] Consider Example 3.9 when the last link
principle is applied, A2 defeats A3. Then, we have Outfamily(F1, stb) = {{h, o}},
which is equal to Reduction(H).
Example 5.3 [Reduction, Multiple extensions] Consider the hierarchical abstract nor-
mative system of Figure 3 when the last link principle is applied. We obtain the argu-
mentation framework shown in Figure 4, written asF3, yielding Outfamily(F3, stb) =
{{b, c}, {¬b}}. Note that here, we have two distinct stable extensions.
Since stable extensions do not necessarily exist for all argumentation frameworks,
the Reduction of a hierarchical abstract normative system might not exist.
Example 5.4 [Reduction, Empty extension] Consider the hierarchi-
cal abstract normative system H = 〈L,N,C, r〉 where N =
{(c, d), (p,¬d), (z,¬c), (¬d,¬z), (r, z), (b, c)}, C = {b, r, p} and r(c, d) = 5,
r(p,¬d) = 4, r(z,¬c) = 6, r(¬d,¬z) = 2, r(r, z) = 1 and r(b, c) = 0. When the
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A4
[(a,b),(b,c),(c,b)]
A1
[(a,b)]
A2
[(a, ¬b)]
A3
[(a,b),(b,c)]
A0
[a]
Fig. 4. The argumentation framework obtained for the hierarchical abstract normative system
of Figure 3.
A4
[(r,z)]
A1 [r]
A2
[p]
A3
[(b,c)]
A0
[b]
A8A7
A6 A5
[(p, ¬d)][(b,c),(c,d)]
[(r,z),(z,¬c)] [(p, ¬d),[(¬d,¬z)]]
Fig. 5. An argumentation framework with no stable extension.
last link principle is applied, this hierarchical abstract normative system yields the
argumentation framework shown in Figure 5, which has no stable extension.
6 Representation result for Optimization
In principle, Optimization is realized by adding norms in order of priority which are
consistent with the context, until no more norms can be added, obtaining a maximal
set of obeyable norms, following which conclusions can be computed. For each norm
that does not belong to the maximal set of obeyable norms, if it is in a consistent path
of a hierarchical abstract normative system H, it is the weakest norm of this path.
In terms of the terminology of argumentation, a consistent path of H is an argument
of the corresponding argumentation framework. Hence, for an ordinary argument, if
its top norm is the weakest norm that does not belong to the maximal obeyable set,
then this argument should not be accepted. In other words, this argument should be
defeated by some accepted argument. Furthermore, when an argument is rejected, all
its super-arguments should be rejected. For instance, as illustrated in Figure 1, the
maximal obeyable set of norms is {(h, o), (w,¬o)}. The norm (w, h) does no belong
to this set. So, the arguments containing (w, h), i.e., [(w, h)] and [(w, h), (h, o)],
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should be rejected.
In this paper, given an argument α, a sub-argument of α is called the weakest sub-
argument of α, if it is an ordinary argument and its top norm is the weakest norm of
α.
Definition 6.1 [Weakest sub-argument] Given a totally ordered hierarchical abstract
normative systemH = 〈L, N,C, r〉 and the corresponding argumentation framework
F = (Arg(H), Def(H,w)), for all α = [u1, . . . , un] ∈ Arg(H), if ui is the weakest
norm of α, then the ordinary sub-argument of α whose top norm is ui is called the
weakest sub-argument of α.
Then, the set of super-arguments of α′ —the weakest sub-argument of α— is
called the weakest arguments with respect to α, formally defined as follows.
Definition 6.2 [Weakest argument] Given a totally ordered hierarchical abstract nor-
mative system H = 〈L, N,C, r〉 and the corresponding argumentation framework
F = (Arg(H), Def(H,w)), for all α = [u1, . . . , un] ∈ Arg(H), let α′ be the weak-
est sub-argument of α. Then, the set of weakest arguments with respect to α is defined
as warg(α) = sup(α′).
The notion of weakest arguments can be illustrated by the following example.
Example 6.3 [Order puzzle, weakest arguments] Consider the argumentation frame-
work in Figure 2. When applying the weakest link principle, A3 defeats A2. Accord-
ing to Definition 6.2, warg(A1) = {A1}, warg(A2) = {A1, A2}, and warg(A3) =
{A3}.
Based on the concept of weakest arguments, when an argument α defeats another
argument β according to the weakest link principle, there are two different cases,
namely that α is in the set of weakest arguments with respect to β, or that it is not.
First, consider the case where α is in warg(β). In this case, it means that the
weakest norm of β is also the weakest norm of α.
Proposition 6.4 (Shared weakest norm) Given F = (Arg(H), Def(H,w)), for all
(α, β) ∈ Def(H,w), if u is the weakest norm of β and α ∈ warg(β), then u is the
weakest norm of α.
Proof. We use proof by contradiction. Assume that u is not the weakest norm of α.
Then, there exists u′ such that u > u′. Since u′ does not belong to β, it holds that
β w α. This contradicts (α, β) ∈ Def(H,w). Thus the assumption is false, i.e., u
is the weakest norm of α. 2
Given that α and β share a weakest norm, according to the definition of Optimiza-
tion, this weakest norm does not belong to the maximal obeyable set. Hence, both α
and β cannot be accepted. In this paper, we use an auxiliary argument aux to defeat
all arguments in warg(β) that should not be accepted.
The second case occurs when α is not in warg(β). Here, the weakest norm of
α is superior to the weakest norm of β. So, if α is accepted, then all arguments in
warg(β) should be rejected. For this purpose, we may use α to defeat each argument
inwarg(β). In addition, since the defeat from α to each super-argument of β is already
in Arg(H), only the arguments in warg(β) ∩ psub(β) should be added to Arg(H).
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According to the above observations, an expanded argumentation framework of F
with auxiliary defeats on weakest arguments is defined as follows.
Definition 6.5 [Expanded argumentation framework with additional defeats on weak-
est arguments] Let F = (Arg(H),Def(H,w)) be an argumentation framework
that is constructed from a totally ordered hierarchical abstract normative system
H = 〈L, N,C, r〉, and aux be an auxiliary argument such that aux /∈ Arg(H).
The expanded argumentation framework of F with auxiliary defeats on weakest
arguments is F ′ = (Arg(H) ∪ {aux}, Def(H,w) ∪ Φ1 ∪ Φ2) where Φ1 =
∪(α,β)∈Def(H,w)∧α/∈warg(β){(α, γ) | γ ∈ warg(β) ∩ psub(β)}, and Φ2 =
∪(α,β)∈Def(H,w)∧α∈warg(β){(aux, γ) | γ ∈ warg(β)}.
In Definition 6.5, Φ1 is the set of defeats from α that is not a weakest argument
with respect to β, and Φ2 is the set of defeats from the auxiliary argument aux when
α is a weakest argument with respect to β.
The following lemma and proposition show that Optimization can be represented
in formal argumentation by using weakest link together with auxiliary defeats.
Lemma 6.6 (Unique extension of Optimization) Let H = 〈L, N,C, r〉 be a totally
ordered hierarchical abstract normative system, and F ′ be an argumentation frame-
work ofH with additional defeats on weakest arguments presented in Definition 6.2. It
holds that F ′ is acyclic, and therefore has a unique extension under stable semantics.
Proof. According to Lemma 4.1, F is acyclic. The addition of Φ2 does not produce
cycles. Meanwhile, for all (α, γ) ∈ Φ1, since α defeats β and γ is a weakest argument
with respect to β, α w γ. So, the addition of Φ2 does not produce cycles either. As
a result, F ′ is acyclic, and therefore has a unique extension under stable semantics.
Proposition 6.7 (Optimization is weakest link plus auxiliary defeats) Let H =
〈L, N,C, r〉 be a totally ordered hierarchical abstract normative system, and F ′
be an argumentation framework of H with additional defeats on weakest arguments
presented in Definition 6.2. It holds that Optimization(H) = {concl(α) | α ∈
E \ {aux}, α is an ordinary argument} where E is the unique stable extension of F ′.
Proof. This proof is similar to that of Greedy: given the Optimization extension, we
show how to construct a stable extension of the expanded argumentation framework
whose conclusions coincide with the Optimization extension. Since the argumentation
framework has only one extension (Lemma 6.6), this completes the proof.
By Definition 2.9, Optimization(H) is the set of elements x such that there is a
path in H from an element in C to x with respect to a set of norms R ⊆ N . Given
T = (u1, u2, . . . , un) the linear order on N such that u1 > u2 > · · · > un,
R is inductively defined by R = Rn, where R0 = ∅; Ri+1 = Ri ∪ {ui} if
C ∪R(C) is consistent where R = Ri ∪ {ui}, and Ri+1 = Ri otherwise.
Let E = {aux} ∪ {α ∈ Arg (H) | α ∈ C is a context argument} ∪
{[u1, . . . , un] ∈ Arg(H) | n ≥ 1, ant(u1) ∈ C, {ant(u2) . . . , ant(un), cons(un)} ⊆
Optimization(H)}. From the consistency of the extensions (Proposition 3.11) and the
construction of Optimization we know that there is a consistent path to any element
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of Optimization(H), and thus for any argument of Optimization(H) there is an or-
dinary argument with that element as its conclusion, and thus Optimization(H) =
{concl(α) | α ∈ E \ {aux}, α is an ordinary argument}.
Now we only need to prove that E is a stable extension of F ′.
We use proof by contradiction. So assume that E is not a stable extension. On the
one hand, given that Optimization(H) is consistent, and thus the extension E is con-
flict free, and given that context arguments defeat all conflicting ordinary arguments
and are thus included in E, there must be α = [u1, . . . , un] ∈ Arg(H) \ E, such
that α is not defeated by any argument in E. On the other hand, since α /∈ E, there
exists a weakest norm uj of α such that uj /∈ R. Let i be the index where uj can not
be added to Ri since C ∪ R(C) is consistent where R = Rj+1 = Ri ∪ {uj}. Let
α′ = [u1, . . . , uk] where k ≥ j, and β = [v1, . . . , vm] such that {v1, . . . , vm} ⊆ Ri+1
and vm = uk. Since uj < v for all v ∈ Ri, it holds that β defeats α′. Then,
we have the following two possible cases. If uj ∈ {v1, . . . , vm}, then α is de-
feated by aux ∈ E. Contradiction. Otherwise, uj /∈ {v1, . . . , vm}. In this case,
{v1, . . . , vm} ⊆ Ri and C ∪ R(C) is consistent where R = Ri. So, β is in E. Con-
tradiction. So the assumption is false, i.e., E is a stable extension. This completes the
proof.
Now, let us consider a revised version of the Order puzzle as follows.
Example 6.8 [Order puzzle, Optimization] Let H′ = 〈L,N,C, r〉 be a hierar-
chical abstract normative system, where L = {w, h, o,¬w,¬h,¬o,>}, N =
{(w, h), (w,¬h), (h, o), (¬h, o), (w,¬o)}, C = {w,>}, r(w, h) = 1, r(w,¬h) = 0,
r(h, o) = 3, r(¬h, o) = 4, r(w,¬o) = 2. The maximal set of obeyable norms
is R = {(¬h, o), (h, o), (w,¬o)} and so Optimization(H′) = {¬o}. Figure 6 illus-
trates the argumentation framework obtained from this hierarchical abstract normative
system, by adding an auxiliary argument and two auxiliary defeats. In this exam-
ple, since A5 is neither in warg(A3) = {A1, A3} nor in warg(A4) = {A2, A4},
the two auxiliary defeats are from A5 to A1 and A2 respectively. Then, under
stable semantics, the expanded argumentation framework has a unique extension
E = {aux, A0, A5}. As a result, the set of conclusions {concl(α) | α ∈ E \
{aux}, α is an ordinary argument} = {concl(A5)} = {¬o}.
Finally, let us consider an expanded argumentation framework where auxiliary
defeats are from the auxiliary argument aux.
Example 6.9 [Empty Optimization] Let H = 〈L,N , C, r〉 be a hierarchical abstract
normative system, where L = {a, b, c,¬a,¬b,¬c,>}, N = {(a, b), (b, c), (b,¬c)},
C = {a,>}, r(a, b) = 1, r(b, c) = 2, r(b,¬c) = 3. The maximal set of
obeyable norms is R = {(b, c), (b,¬c)} and so Optimization(H) = ∅. Figure
7 illustrates the argumentation framework obtained from this hierarchical abstract
normative system, by adding an auxiliary argument and three auxiliary defeats. In
this example, since A3 is in warg(A2) = {A1, A2, A3}, the three auxiliary defeats
are from aux. Then, under stable semantics, the expanded argumentation frame-
work has a unique extension E = {aux, A0}. As a result, the set of conclusions
{concl(α) | α ∈ E \ {aux}, α is an ordinary argument} = ∅.
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A0
[w]
A3
[(w,h),(h,o)]
A1
[(w,h)]
A4
[(w,¬h),(¬h,o)]
A2
[(w,¬h)]
A5
[(w,¬o)]
aux
Fig. 6. Argumentation framework expanded by an auxiliary argument and two auxiliary defeats
(denoted using dashed lines).
A0
[a]
A1 A2
A3
[(a,b)] [(a,b),(b,c)]
[(a,b),(b,¬c)]
aux
Fig. 7. Argumentation framework expanded by an auxiliary argument and three auxiliary
defeats (denoted using dashed lines).
7 Discussions and related work
In the previous sections, after defining three detachment procedures for totally ordered
hierarchical abstract normative systems motivated by the Order puzzle example, we
formulated an argumentation theory to represent them. The role of examples in the
study of logic has a long and rich history. Traditionally, a logic was proposed to model
some example problem, following which examples were introduced to highlight para-
doxes or inconsistencies in the logic, whereupon a new logic was proposed to address
these problems, and the cycle repeated. While this approach has significantly enriched
the field, it is not without problems. For example, there is still a debate regarding deon-
tic detachment within the community, as in some cases, deontic detachment intuitively
holds, and in other cases it does not [23]. Given this, we do not seek to claim that the
detachment procedures we present in this paper are in any sense the ‘right’ logics.
Instead, our goal is to answer the following questions.
(i) What are the general properties of systems considered relevant to some problem?
B. Liao, N. Oren, L. van der Torre, S. Villata 23
A3A2
A1
A0
[a]
[(a,b)]
[(a,b),(b,¬c)] [(a,c)]
A4
[(a,c),(c,¬b)]
Fig. 8. Argumentation framework constructed from a preordered hierarchical abstract norma-
tive system.
(ii) Given an application, what choices should be made in order to obtain a solution?
In this paper, the systems we considered are the three different detachment proce-
dures, encoded in the general framework of hierarchical abstract normative systems.
The property we considered is then the conclusions that one can draw from each of
the detachment procedures in the context of prioritized norms, which we describe in
the context of an argumentation system.
Our results then characterize the outputs of Greedy, Reduction and Optimization
in terms of argumentation for a totally ordered hierarchical abstract normative system,
allowing one to decide which approach is relevant to their needs by understanding the
effects of each approach through the argumentation literature. The semantics associ-
ated with each approach also sheds light on the complexity of computing conclusions
in the normative context.
Furthermore, it is important to note that our representation results only hold when
the hierarchical abstract normative system is totally ordered. This is illustrated by the
following example, which shows that Greedy does not match the results of weakest
link when one does not have a total order over preferences.
Let H = 〈L,N,C, r〉 be a hierarchical abstract normative system, where N =
{(a, b), (a, c), (b,¬c), (c,¬b)} C = {a} and r(a, b) = 1, r(a, c) = 1, r(b,¬c) = 2
and r(c,¬b) = 2}. On the one hand, by Greedy, there are two extensions {b,¬c} and
{c,¬b}. On the other hand, by the weakest link principle, the argumentation frame-
work constructed from H is illustrated in Figure 8. Under stable semantics, there are
three extensions {A0, A1, A2}, {A0, A1, A3}, and {A0, A3, A4}. So, there are three
conclusion extensions {b,¬c}, {b, c}, {c,¬b}. As a result, the set of conclusions
obtained by Greedy is not equal to the one obtained by argumentation using the weak-
est link principle. We leave identifying valid representation results for hierarchical
abstract normative systems containing preference preorders as an avenue for future
research.
Regarding related work, Young et al. [32] endowed Brewka’s prioritized default
logic (PDL) with argumentation semantics using the ASPIC+ framework for struc-
tured argumentation [22]. More precisely, their goal is to define a preference ordering
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over arguments %, based on the strict total order over defeasible rules defined to in-
stantiate ASPIC+ to PDL, so as to ensure that an extension within PDL corresponds
to the justified conclusions of its ASPIC+ instantiation. Several options are inves-
tigated, and they demonstrate that the standard ASPIC+ elitist ordering cannot be
used to calculate % as there is no correspondence between the argumentation-defined
inferences and PDL, and the same holds for a disjoint elitist preference ordering. The
authors come up with a new argument preference ordering definition which captures
both preferences over arguments and also when defeasible rules become applicable in
the arguments’ construction, leading to the definition of a strict total order on defeasi-
ble rules and corresponding non-strict arguments. Their representation theorem shows
that a correspondence always exists between the inferences made in PDL and the con-
clusions of justified arguments in the ASPIC+ instantiation under stable semantics.
Brewka and Eiter [7] consider programs supplied with priority information,
which is given by a supplementary strict partial ordering of the rules. This ad-
ditional information is used to solve potential conflicts. Moreover, their idea is
that conclusions should be only those literals that are contained in at least one
answer set. They propose to use preferences on rules for selecting a subset of the
answer sets, called the preferred answer sets. In their approach, a rule is applied
unless it is defeated via its assumptions by rules of higher priorities. Our definition
(Def. 2.6) and the original formalism of Brewka and Eiter [7] are different, in the
sense that in our definition we do not make use of default negation to represent the
exceptions, i.e., the defeasibility, of a (strict) rule. Rather, we use defeasible rules
and the notion of the applicability of such rules. This means that the correct trans-
lation of the Order Puzzle of Example 2.2 ends up with the following logic program 1 :
r0 : w.
r1 : h : - not ¬h, w.
r2 : ¬o : - not o, w.
r3 : o : - not ¬o, h.
r0 < r3 < r2 < r1
If preferences are disregarded, then this logic program has two answer sets: {w, h,¬o}
and {w, h, o}. Thus, considering preferences, the latter is the unique preferred answer
set. After dropping the context w from the answer set, we get an extension {h, o},
which is identical to the result obtained in Example 2.7.
Dung [11] presents an approach to deal with contradictory conclusions in defea-
sible reasoning with priorities. More precisely, he starts from the observation that
often, the proposed approaches to defeasible reasoning with priorities (e.g., [5,27,21])
sanction contradictory conclusions, as exemplified by ASPIC+ using the weakest
link principle together with the elitist ordering which returns contradictory conclu-
sions with respect to its other three attack relations, and the conclusions reached with
the well known approach of Brewka and Eiter [7]. Dung shows then that the seman-
1 Note that in Nrewka and Eiter’s original formulation [7] r0 < r3 means that r0 has higher priority than
r3.
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tics for any complex interpretation of default preferences can be characterized by a
subset of the set of stable extensions with respect to the normal attack relation as-
signments, i.e., a normal form for ordinary attack relation assignments. In the setting
of this paper, the notion of ‘normal attack relation’ could be defined as follows. Let
α = (a1, . . . , an) and β = (b1, . . . , bm) be arguments constructed from a hierarchical
abstract normative system. Since we have no Pollock style undercutting argument (as
in ASPIC+) and each norm is assumed to be defeasible, α is said to normally attack
argument β if and only if β has a sub-argument β′ such that concl(α) = concl(β′),
and r((an−1, an)) ≥ r((bm−1, bm)). According to Definitions 3.3 and 3.5, the nor-
mal defeat relation is equivalent to the defeat relation using the last link principle in
this paper.
Kakas et al. [18] present a logic of arguments called argumentation logic, where
the foundations of classical logical reasoning are represented from an argumentation
perspective. More precisely, their goal is to integrate into the single argumentative
representation framework both classical reasoning, as in propositional logic, and de-
feasible reasoning.
You et al. [31] define a prioritized argumentative characterization of non-
monotonic reasoning, by casting default reasoning as a form of prioritized argumen-
tation. They illustrate how the parameterized formulation of priority may be used to
allow various extensions and modifications to default reasoning.
We, and all these approaches, share the idea that an argumentative characterization
of NMR formalisms, like prioritized default logic in Young’s case and hierarchical ab-
stract normative systems in our approach, contributes to make the inference process
more transparent to humans. However, the targeted NMR formalism is different, lead-
ing to different challenges in the representation results. To the best of our knowledge,
no other approach addressed the challenge of an argumentative characterization of
prioritized normative reasoning.
The reason we study prioritized normative reasoning in the setting of formal ar-
gumentation is twofold. First, formal argumentation has been recognized as a popular
research area in AI, thanks to its ability to make the inference process more intuitive
and provide natural explanations for the reasoning process [8]; its flexibility in dealing
with the dynamics of the system; and its appeal in sometimes being more computation-
ally efficient than competing approaches. Second, while some progress has been made
on the use of priorities within argumentation (e.g., [2,21]), how to represent different
approaches for prioritized normative reasoning in argumentation is still a challenging
issue.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we embedded three approaches to prioritized normative reasoning—
namely the Greedy [32], Reduction [5] and Optimization [13] approaches—within
the framework of a hierarchical abstract normative system. Within such a system,
conditional norms are represented by a binary relation over literals, and priorities are
represented by natural numbers. Hierarchical abstract normative systems provide an
elegant visualisation of a normative system, with conflicts shown as two paths to a
proposition and its negation. Since both conflicts and exceptions can be encoded,
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such systems are inherently non-monotonic. In Dung [10], the author pointed out
that “many of the major approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning in AI and logic pro-
gramming are different forms of argumentation”, and inspired by this, we described
how arguments can be instantiated as paths through a hierarchical abstract normative
system; demonstrated that this instantiation satisfies certain desirable properties; and
described how attacks and defeats between these arguments can be identified. Defeats
in particular are dependent on the priorities associated with the arguments, and several
different techniques have been proposed to lift priorities from argument components
— made up of norms in the context of our work — to the arguments themselves [21].
We demonstrated that for a total ordering of priorities, lifting priorities to arguments
based on the weakest link principle, evaluated using the stable semantics, is equiv-
alent to Greedy; that lifting priorities to arguments based on last link and using the
stable semantics is equivalent to Reduction; and that the Optimization approach can
be encoded by an argumentation system which uses weakest link together with the
stable semantics, and which introduces additional defeats capturing implicit conflicts
between arguments.
This last result—which requires a relatively complex argumentative
representation—opens up an interesting avenue for future work, namely in de-
termining which non-monotonic logics can be easily captured through standard
formal argumentation techniques, and which require additional rules or axioms in
order to be represented. We note that on the argumentation side, work on bipolar
argumentation (e.g., [9]) has considered introducing additional defeats between
arguments based on some notion of support, and we intend to investigate how the
additional defeats we introduced can be categorized in such frameworks.
Apart from our representation results, the use of argumentation allows us to make
some useful observations, such as that Reduction will sometimes not reach any conclu-
sions. Furthermore, argumentation can be used to provide explanation [8]. When im-
plemented, a system building on our approach can help users understand what norms
they should comply with, and why. For large normative systems, the use of stable
semantics to compute Reduction and Optimization results in a high computational
overhead, while Greedy is computationally efficient. Ultimately, selecting the correct
reasoning procedure thus requires giving consideration to both reasoning complexity,
and the domain in which the system will be used.
In closing, our main observations can be summarized as follows. First, from a
normative systems perspective, we know there are many many logics of prioritized
rules/norms, and we consider only three here. The choice we make (Greedy, Re-
duction and Optimization) may seem arbitrary. However, many other examples, in
particular detachment procedures not satisfying defeasible deontic detachment, are
much easer to characterize, while the three throughput variants of Greedy, Reduction
and Optimization can be derived from the existing results. Furthermore, these three
alternatives display quite diverse behavior, and are illustrative of the various kind of
approaches around.
Second, the results we present are interesting and promising, but the work on
representing prioritized rules/norms using argumentation has only begun, and there
are many open issues. In particular, the restriction to totally ordered systems must be
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relaxed in future work.
Third, given the large number of possibilities and the vast existing literature on
normative rules/norms, a different methodology is needed for dealing with prioritized
rules/norms in formal argumentation.
Finally, one may wonder why our results have not been shown before, given the
long standing discussion on weakest vs last link at least since the work of Pollock [25],
and the central role of prioritized rules in many structured argumentation theories like
ASPIC+. The reason, we believe, is that it is easier to study these issues on a small
fragment, like hierarchical abstract normative systems, than on a very general theory
like ASPIC+.
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